THE POLITICAL VETO IS A PLAYER IN THE ACTOR-INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
https://doi.org/10.48137/23116412_2025_4_4
Abstract
The article analyzes the issues related to the phenomenon of political veto players, which can be interpreted in various actor-institutional frameworks. On the one hand, the classical approach focuses on formal and legal mechanisms of political governance that correlate with the functioning of the political system of society. On the other hand, the political–regime configurations of modernity and their dynamics lead to the fact that the role of veto players is postulated much more broadly, especially in the context of an authoritarian political process that devalues the formal institutional architecture and automatically actualizes informal practices. At the same time, attention is focused on the category of “institutionalized subject”, which correlates with the veto player. In addition, the concept of selectivity is considered, which contributes to explaining the nature of socio-political differentiation.
Keywords
Veto player,
political decision-making,
political regime,
political actors,
political institutions,
the institutionalized entity,
selectorate
Supporting agencies: The article was prepared at the State Academic University of the Humanities as part of the state assignment of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation, the FZNF-2023- 0004 project – «Digitalization and formation of a modern information society: cognitive, economic, political and legal aspects» (123022000042-0).
About the Author
V. O. Krotkov
State Academic University of Humanities ; Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Krotkov Vladimir O. – Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor of the Department of «Applied Political Science», Senior Researcher at the Department of Political Science
Moscow
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Review
For citations:
Krotkov V.O. THE POLITICAL VETO IS A PLAYER IN THE ACTOR-INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT. Post–Soviet Continent. 2025;(4):4-14. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.48137/23116412_2025_4_4
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